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Abstract 
This paper discusses definitions that have been developed and used in the study of polycentric 
governance. It offers conceptual refinements for purposes of reducing fuzziness, showing 
challenges of operationalization and application to an empirical setting - in other words, for 
analyzing governance arrangements through the polycentricity lens. One defining element of 
polycentricity is the presence of ‘multiple decision-making centers’. This paper shows that 
this multiplicity is specific to the good/problem in focus, the center’s tasks/ responsibilities, 
the level in focus and analytical system boundaries. Functional overlapping among those 
centers is required to consider centers forming one system in relation to a good. These 
specificities should be examined for comparisons on polycentricity influencing the 
functioning of systems. 
The paper applies those conceptual refinements to the implementation of the EU Water 
Framework Directive in Berlin and Hamburg. It characterizes the two cases in terms of their 
polycentricity. It compares their functioning so far and how the latter relates to interactions 
and social interrelations. The polycentricity lens illuminates important features and 
differences: given an overall multiplicity of centers and a similar rule setting in both cities, the 
differences in the distribution of responsibilities and social interrelations led to a faster but 
less integrated implementation in Hamburg compared to Berlin.  
The application of the proposed refinements yields insights into further work to be done in 
favor of theory-building on the functioning of polycentric governance systems. 
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Introduction 
The concept of polycentric governance is used increasingly in research - often in a normative 
manner associated with values such as ‘better performance’. The analysis of different 
governance systems shall prove this. Based on existing definitions, this paper shows the 
fuzziness of this concept, arguing a clearer operationalization is still needed to distinguish 
polycentric governance from other kinds of structures in order to analyze differences in their 
functioning. The question is do we really know what polycentric governance is when we see 
it? And do we all see the same when we see it? I argue that based on existing definitions and 
operationalizations this is, by now, not the case. 
This paper follows the statement of Ostrom et al. (1961): “Both the structure and the behavior 
of the system need analysis before any reasonable estimate can be made of its performance in 
dealing with the various public problems arising in a metropolitan community. “ 
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The first part of this paper moves forward from contrasting definitions – showing the 
variations of defining elements used - to propose steps to operationalize the concept and to 
analyze governance systems more systematically in order to facilitate empirical comparisons. 
The proposed steps focus on the multiplicity of decision-making centers and related defining 
elements. They are underpinned by thought experiments from the field of water governance 
showing that altering the analytical focus significantly alters the classification as polycentric 
or not, or, more or less polycentric. Boxes supplement each step containing the application to 
the local implementation of the EU Water Framework Directive (WFD) in the German city-
states Berlin and Hamburg. 
The second part is dedicated to the behavior of the system. The progress of WFD 
implementation in Berlin and Hamburg – the performance of both systems – illustrates the 
necessity of an increasing attention on interactions and social interrelations among decision-
making centers to explain the functioning of those systems.  
The third part, in terms of a research agenda, elaborates questions concerning the relation 
between multiplicity characteristics – the multiplicity of centers and related elements - and the 
functioning of systems. 
The case data used for illustration was extracted from an in-depth case study comparison on 
the EU WFD implementation processes in Berlin and Hamburg, Germany. Data was collected 
conducting semi-structured interviews with authorities and NGOs, document analysis and 
participatory observation (Schröder, 2014).   
Polycentric governance: You know it when you see it!? 
A large variety of definitions of polycentricity or polycentric governance can be found in the 
literature (just to name the mostly (Ostrom et al., 1961) and a few of the other widely cited 
works: Ostrom, 1999: 55, 73; Ostrom, 2001: 2; Skelcher, 2005: 89; Huitema et al. 2009; 
Ostrom, 2005: 283; Andersson and Ostrom, 2008: 79; Pahl-Wostl, 2009: 357; McGinnis and 
Ostrom, 2011: 15; McGinnis, 2011: 171; Oakerson and Parks, 2011: 153; Galaz et al., 2012: 
22; Pahl-Wostl and Knieper (2014: 140); etc. see Tab. 1). Existing definitions vary in their 
understanding of what is covered by polycentricity: Differences exist in terms of structures 
and/ or processes as well as “a nonhierarchical, institutional, and cultural framework” (Aligica 
and Tarko, 2012: 251); in terms of the degree of autonomy or independence of actors to be 
considered as decision-making centers (formally independent, de-facto independent, 
relatively…, semi, substantive etc.); in terms of diverse types of organizations, differing 
scales and levels; and in terms of overlapping and redundancy.  
Not all elements appearing in those definitions can be combined to a common understanding 
of polycentric governance. What all definitions share is referring to the existence of ‘multiple 
decision-making centers’ expressed in terms of actors, units, elements, authorities and 
organizations. Based on this commonality, I define polycentric governance systems here as 
characterized at least by a multiplicity of decision-making centers, which, for the purpose of 
system comparisons, are governing a certain good or problem within defined system 
boundaries. This supplement is further elaborated below. 
The one commonality of multiple centers leaves open questions on its operationalization. 
Obviously there are many decision-making centers in any given society. If we consider all of 
these then we can say everything has multiple centers and is therefore potentially polycentric 
– ignoring the other potential elements for now. In such a case comparing different settings 
with the polycentricity lens might be less revealing. This raises the question, which decision-
making centers need to be considered in order to determine a multiplicity among them. And 
how does this relate to the functioning of a governance system? I assert that there are at least 
five characteristics determining a multiplicity or a singularity of centers. 
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First, what do centers decide on? I argue that polycentricity should be identified specifically to 
a good or problem which is governed and that centers can be considered specifically to their 
tasks.  
Second, clarification is needed what is aggregated to a unit – a center. Here, this is the unit 
where, by some sort of membership, no fully included sub-unit may decide (and implement) 
what is not intended by the whole unit. This may result in different sizes of centers in one 
setting ranging from individuals, to collectives, organizations or states. 
Third, how independent needs a unit to be to be considered a center? This paper follows the 
argumentation of Marshall (2015) that centers need to have considerable de facto autonomy 
(in contrast to de jure autonomy). In addition, centers should actively “exercise […] diverse 
opinions and preferences” (Aligica, 2014: 61). Centers of described cases may at least be able 
to actively exercise their diverse opinions and preferences regarding some issues which are 
relevant for governing the good or problem in focus. This does not need to be the case for the 
full range of their decision-making capabilities. 
Fourth, a reference point to determine the boundaries, within to look for multiple centers, is 
needed. This is here the analytical system.  
Fifth, the centers need to be functionally interlinked in terms of the good or problem in focus, 
creating overlapping within a system.  
Definitions of polycentric governance generally contain more elements than just ‘multiple 
centers’. Based on these elements and their operationalization, governance systems might be 
identified as polycentric or not, a matter of binarity, as more or less polycentric, a matter of 
degree (e.g. in Pahl-Wostl and Knieper, 2014), or as type x/ y/ z of polycentric governance, a 
matter of different manifestations (e.g. Aligica and Tarco (2012: 257) map varieties of 
polycentricity). The choice of defining elements and their specific operationalization 
deserves, especially for statements on performance, further attention.  
This choice also determines whether polycentric governance could be understood as an 
umbrella concept for several other governance concepts, such as markets, federalism, 
hierarchies, collaborative governance and fragmentation, or as a governance type with 
specific characteristics and, deviating, functioning. 
 
Ostrom et al., 1961 
"’Polycentric’ connotes many centers of decision-making which are formally independent of each other. Whether they 
actually function independently, or instead constitute an interdependent system of relations, is an empirical question in 
particular cases. To the extent that they take each other into account in competitive relationships, enter into various 
contractual and cooperative undertakings or have recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts, the various 
political jurisdictions in a metropolitan area may function in a coherent manner with consistent and predictable patterns of 
interacting behavior. To the extent that this is so, they may be said to function as a ‘system’."  
 
Ostrom, 1999 
“A polycentric order is defined as one where many elements are capable of making mutual adjustments for ordering 
relationships with one another within a general system of rules where each element acts with independence of other 
elements. Spontaneity, in the sense that individuals will be led to organize elements in a polycentric order, initiate self-
enforcing arrangements and alter basic rules, is explored as an attribute of a polycentric order.” and 
“The essential defining characteristics of a polycentric political system is one where many officials and decision 
structures are assigned limited and relatively autonomous prerogatives to determine, enforce and alter legal relationships. 
No one office or decision structure has an ultimate monopoly over the legitimate use of force in a polycentric political 
system.” 
 
Ostrom, 2001 
“Polycentric systems are the organisation of small-, medium-, and large-scale democratic units that each may exercise 
considerable independence to make and enforce rules within a circumscribed scope of authority for a specified 
geographical area. Some units may be general purpose governments whereas others may be highly specialized.” 
 
Skelcher, 2005 
In “a polycentric system…. political authority is dispersed across separately constituted bodies with overlapping 
jurisdictions that do not stand in hierarchical relationship to each other.”   
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Ostrom, 2005 
“By polycentric I mean a system where citizens are able to organize not just one but multiple governing authorities at 
differing scales. Each unit exercises considerable independence to make and enforce rules within a circumscribed domain 
of authority for a specified geographic area.” 
 
Andersson, Ostrom, 2008 
“polycentricity - the relationships among multiple authorities with overlapping jurisdictions” and 
“Polycentric governance … is a broad type of governance regime that possesses a number of specific institutional attributes 
capable of providing and producing essential collective goods and services to the citizens in that regime.” and 
“In a polycentric governance system that is operationalized to a greater or lesser extent in the world of public affairs, each 
unit exercises considerable independence to make and enforce rules within a circumscribed scope of authority for a 
specified geographical area. In such a system, some units are general-purpose governments while others may be highly 
specialized.” 
 
Huitema et al., 2009 
Quotes Skelcher, 2005 and “polycentric systems have a high degree of overlap and redundancy, and this makes them less 
vulnerable: if one unit fails, others may take over their functions” 
 
Pahl-Wostl, 2009 
“polycentric governance systems are defined here as complex, modular systems where differently sized governance units 
with different purpose, organization, spatial location interact to form together a largely self-organized governance regime. 
Polycentric governance systems are characterized by many degrees of freedom at different levels.” 
 
McGinnis, Ostrom, 2011 
“Polycentric governance requires a complex combination of multiple levels and diverse types of organizations drawn from 
the public, private, and voluntary sectors that have overlapping realms of responsibility and functional capacities…. 
[P]rivate corporations, voluntary associations, and community-based organizations play critical supporting roles in a 
polycentric system of governance, even if they have not been assigned public roles in an official manner.” 
 
Oakerson, Parks, 2011 
“Polycentricity describes a process of decision making where multiple independent actors interact to produce an outcome 
that is commonly valued. … Polycentricity describes a pattern of governance that emerges from the interactions of multiple 
independent centers of authority …  polycentricity depends on the absence of dominance among various centers of 
authority” and 
“Polycentricity thus describes a system of qualified independence among interdependent centers of authority“ 
 
Galaz et al., 2012 
“forms of multi-actor and multi-level responses can be viewed as providing polycentric order, in the sense that they include 
the self-organizing relationship between many centers of decision-making that are formally independent of each other” 
and  “By ‘polycentric order’ we refer to the processes and structures that allow complex actor constellations not subject to 
any single authoritative coordinating mechanisms or authority, to self-organize and make mutual adjustments” 
 
Aligica, Tarko, 2012 
“Polycentricity … defined as a social system of many decision centers having limited and autonomous prerogatives and 
operating under an overarching set of rules.” and  “polycentric order means more than just a matter of different centers of 
decision operating in competition with each other in a specific domain or area.  Polycentricity is a complex system of 
powers, incentives, rules, values, and individual attitudes combined in a complex system of relationships at different levels.” 
and  
“Polycentricity emerges as a nonhierarchical, institutional, and cultural framework that makes possible the coexistence 
of multiple centers of decision making with different objectives and values, and that sets up the stage for an evolutionary 
competition between the complementary ideas and methods of those different decision centers.  The multiple centers of 
decision making may act either all on the same territory or may be territorially delimited from each other in a mutually 
agreed fashion.”  and 
“Polycentricity has three basic features… (1) The multiplicity of decision centers…. (2) The institutional and cultural 
framework that provides the overarching system of rules defining the polycentric system…. (3) Finally, the spontaneous 
order generated by evolutionary competition between the different decision centers’ ideas, methods, and ways of doing 
things.” [italics in original]  
 
Pahl-Wostl, Knieper, 2014 
“According to the definition chosen in this paper, polycentric governance systems are characterized by multiple centers of 
authority and distribution of power along with effective coordination structures.” and 
“Polycentric governance systems must fulfill at least two criteria to function as systems: presence of multiple centers of 
decision making and coordination by an overarching system of rules.” 
 
Tab. 1 Different Definitions of polycentric governance (bold emphasis added) 
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Steps to reduce fuzziness in using the polycentricity lens 
Good or problem specificity 
Identifying a polycentric governance system can begin with the question: ‘What is being 
governed?’ Where the provision or production of a good or the reduction of a problem is 
considered, we can ask what the good or problem in question is. 
Depending on the nature of the good and the interests of the society in that good, various 
actors gain relevance as decision-making centers, e.g. zooming into a system for national 
defense or for water issues. I argue, if polycentricity characteristics, in particular multiplicity, 
shall be used as variables for explaining system performance, they need to be analyzed 
specifically to a good or problem.  
For instance, if there are several producers of drinking water in a water governance system 
but only one company treating waste water for private users, then the system is multicentric 
concerning ‘drinking water production’ but monocentric in terms of ‘waste water treatment’. 
If the analytical focus is slightly changed, the picture might change too. The answer to ‘what 
is being governed?’ is now ‘the river water quality in this system’. The waste water treatment 
company, industrial water treatment facilities (and connected actors), perhaps one or more 
regulatory authorities with responsibility for water quality, land users, etc. also need to be 
considered as centers.  
Clearly defining the good or problem in focus is the key to identifying what is included in or 
excluded from the group of decision-making centers. This directly influences which 
interrelations and interactions might be relevant and should be analyzed to evaluate the 
functioning of a system and how it affects performance. Without this focus, a researcher 
might classify a system as polycentric whereas another one might classify the same system 
differently. This hampers theory development on polycentric governance. Making the good or 
problem in focus explicit would improve the reproducibility of results. Rather different 
governance systems might be comparable in several dimensions but if they are not compared 
with the focus on the same good or problem, statements on performance due to polycentricity 
are questionable. 
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Berlin & Hamburg 
 
• What is the good or problem in focus of the analysis? Which goods or problems are 
affecting or are affected by the governance of this good or problem significantly? 
 
The analysis here focuses on the implementation of the EU WFD in Berlin and Hamburg. 
The WFD-task is to reach the good (ecological) status1 in all water bodies by 20152. 
Especially rivers and their basins, connecting different jurisdictions, are under pressure of 
conflicting usages. There are four main problems in Germany to be solved in order to reach 
a good status in the river systems, which are basically constant variables in the cases of 
Berlin and Hamburg: 
- chemical water quality (nitrates/ phosphates from agriculture, pharmaceuticals) 
- appropriate water quantity in time and space 
- connectivity for fishes and smaller organisms (e.g. damns, weirs,…) 
- hydromorphological changes in the shape of rivers (box profile, concreted banks, 
straightened river shape instead of meandering, no floodplains)  
The WFD-tasks interact with many tasks/ goals of other actors which need to be fulfilled to 
make use of many water-related goods in a society, e.g. drinking and process water, draught 
prevention, fishing, flood protection, transport ways, cultural heritage, space, recreation, 
biodiversity/ nature conservation, agriculture and energy production. This leads to 
numerous functionally interlinked actors with a wide range of heterogeneity in interests. 
They take each other into account to reach their own goals (to differing degrees depending 
on physical properties and power relations). If they do not coordinate with each other, zero-
sum games are more probable or no actor can reach its goals. 
For this reason, it is assumed that the WFD goals cannot be fully reached without 
coordination and public participation. Therefore, the WFD also intends to improve the 
coordination across borders and sectors and public participation in planning measures, 
however, without elaborated formal provisions (except from official public hearings).  
Task specificity 
Even if the good or problem – the special purpose, the main actors are making decisions for or 
against - is defined, there are several options which actors to consider as decision-making 
centers in order to show differences in the multiplicity configuration of systems and its effects 
on the functioning of (poly)centric systems.  
What characterizes system’s center configurations? Do centers need to fulfill the same tasks? 
Or, do they only need to (partially) pursue the same goals? Or, is it sufficient for actors to 
only be functionally interlinked3 concerning one good or problem to be considered as centers? 
And how strong4 does this interlinkage need to be?  
To illustrate this: Is it a simple question whether Berlin and Hamburg are in the same way 
polycentric or not? Both might be called polycentric based on the multiplicity element, but 
they differ significantly along the mentioned categories, with differing implications on their 
implementation strategies and progress (see below). 
Same tasks: In Berlin (Fig. 1), one water management authority is responsible for WFD 
implementation. In contrast, Hamburg (Fig. 2) has eight authorities at two different levels 
                                                 
1 The good ecological status shall be reached in water bodies classified as natural and the good ecological 
potential in water bodies classified as heavily modified. 
2 Exemptions are possible until 2027. The member states are still far away from reaching this goal. 
3 They influence each others goal achievement without sharing any goals.  
4 There may be numerous functionally interlinked centers causing difficulties in comparisons. 
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fulfilling the same task. This is illustrated by the largest (greatest task specificity) circles with 
the same size but different colors.  
Same goals (second largest circles in Fig. 1 and Fig. 2): Related to the good ecological status 
of waters in Berlin, at least six centers (senate and non-senate actors) should be considered as 
relevant in sharing goals with the water management. In Hamburg those are more numerous, 
including several non-state actors, and spread across four levels.  
Functionally interlinked (smallest circles): In contrast to Hamburg, interview partners of 
Berlin’s water management reported5 several centers at district and senate level which are 
functionally interlinked with their WFD related tasks. City planners, for example, prefer space 
close to rivers to build houses with scenic views. This space is lost as restoration area for 
natural river development. 
To conclude, actors considered as centers can at least be categorized in these three different 
ways when using the polycentricity lens. Whether specific systems with different task 
specificity configurations should in the same way be called polycentric, is not a trivial 
question. It needs to be included in the analysis when making any statement on a system’s 
polycentricity and its performance. 
 
 
Fig. 1 Task specificity and levels of decision-making centers in the jurisdiction of Berlin (related centers in 
the surroundings are omitted here) 
 
                                                 
5 The figures include only centers which were reported as relevant by interview partners. Many actor-types, 
invited by Berlin’s water management authority to develop integrative river restoration plans, are not reported as 
relevantly active in Hamburg. This might be due to the fact that Hamburg’s WFD authorities are less ambitious 
in involving other actors in their planning. They try to bypass conflicts about contradicting goals. 
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Fig. 2 Task specificity and levels of decision-making centers in the jurisdiction of Hamburg (related 
centers in the surroundings are omitted here) 
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Berlin & Hamburg 
 
• Which centers are fulfilling key tasks? Which centers share goals with key centers 
and which centers are just functionally interlinked? 
• Are tasks and goals of the different centers aligning or conflicting? 
 
Supplementary to Fig. 1 and Fig. 2, Tab. 2 and Tab. 3 show the tasks of key centers and 
how those relate to the goals of centers categorized as ‘(partially) same goals’ and 
‘functionally interlinked’. This analysis helps categorizing center’s general functional 
relation to each other and to the good/ problem in focus.  
Responsibilities and tasks in Berlin and Hamburg are distributed in quite different ways. In 
Berlin, one senate authority6 is responsible for the planning of WFD measures at the entire 
city area. In Hamburg, seven districts are responsible for WDF-planning. An additional 
water management authority at the senate level (a department of the BSU7) is responsible 
for pre-planning and financial steering. The pre-planning is rather rough and less integrative 
compared to plans of Berlin’s water management authority.   
In both cities similar actor groups with similar goals can be found, although they play 
different roles, such as the nature conservation associations as non-state actors. In Berlin 
these associations8 are not actively involved. In Hamburg, some of these associations 
initiate several small and larger projects in the realm of the WFD. They state WFD goals as 
part of their own goals instead of referring more to the, traditionally established, species 
protection that would stronger align with goals of nature conservation authorities. There is a 
less obvious conflict between WFD planners and actors of nature conservation in Germany, 
mainly due to different time reference points for protection. Listed rare species (which 
could, in extreme, grow on a place polluted with mineral oil) are protected under the Nature 
Conservation Act. Locally, some of those species, or whose habitats, have to be removed to 
reach WFD goals9.  
Tasks are partially carried out by Hamburg’s ‘creek godparents’ (individuals or groups) as 
well. The creek godparents program itself is in some districts supported by the district 
environmental protection/ nature conservation department.  
Non-state-actors working at the edge of fulfilling state duties became possible because the 
senate did not describe WFD measures in river management plans explicitly, in order to not 
turn them to state duties. 
Generally, the analysis of centers and their tasks and goals shows that it can be really 
measure specific whether the water management authorities may expect support or conflict 
from their co-players in the system. Although, the general abundance of center-types might 
be the same among different systems, they do not necessarily need to share the same 
constellation of matching and contradicting goals. 
 
 
                                                 
6 The senate is comparable to a ministry of other German federal states. Below is the district level.  
7 BSU = Authority for City development and Environment 
8 By their own declaration they have enough to do with other projects and are satisfied with public participation 
conducted by Berlin’s WFD planners. 
9 There is no formal prescription in the WFD to solve this problem of institutional interplay. 
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(1) Centers with the same tasks:  
Water Management Authority         
Comparable authorities in Land Brandenburg (perhaps different priorities) 
(2) Centers with partially same goals as (1):  
Water Maintenance Authority       d  
Nature Conservation Authority   a   b  b  b  c 
Water Authority g 
Fishery Bureau  a      a 
Nature Conservation Associations  
(locally not very focused on the WFD) 
 a         a 
Berliner Wasserbetriebe (drinking water 
production & waste water treatment company) 
  e     f  
(3) Functionally interlinked centers*:  
Urban Planning          
Berlin Forestry Agency          
Monument Conservation Authority         
Construction Planning  h 
 
Legend 
 Goal of this center 
 Matching of water management goals with those of the respective center 
 Neutral (irrelevant for center) 
 Unknown 
 Partially contradicting goals (context dependence) 
 Contradictions of water management goals with those of the respective center 
  Mixed: general tendency based on interviews and document analysis | range of possibilities based on special cases 
a certain species are preferred 
b protection of a certain status (e.g. a problem is cutting trees of a certain size for river restoration) 
c differing definition of invasive ‘alien’ species 
d priority of fast drainage and navigability for shipment 
e for drinking water production a better water quality in certain areas is preferred (refers also to inflowing water from 
Brandenburg) whereas conflicts arise when waste water treatment should be further improved (it is already highly 
regulated) 
f Berliner Wasserbetriebe are also responsible for rain water management and prefer measures without costs for the 
company 
g protection of water related systems in case of new ‘constructions’ and water usage allowance, but weighing up of all 
objectives of existing usages and new construction plans in plan-approval procedures 
h plans of the water management need to be further developed by the construction planning authority, but they have 
no background in ecology and are less willing to coordinate with the water management authority. 
* goals of these centers fit or do not fit to goals of the water management authority, but goals are never the same 
Tab. 2 Responsibilities and goals of decision-making centers in Berlin: e.g. River restoration is the goal of 
the water management authority. This goal is partially contradicting with goals/ tasks from the nature 
conservation authority because (b) they protect in certain habitat status which might not align with the 
status resulting from river restoration measures. 
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(1) Centers with the same tasks:  
7 Water Management Authorities (one in each 
district): planning 
       
Water Management Authority (senate level): 
Pre-planning 
       
(2) Centers with partially same goals as (1):  
Water Maintenance Authority (same 
department as water management in districts) 
     d  
Environmental Protection Authority (one in 
each district)* 
       
Nature Conservation Authority   a   b  b  b  c 
Water Authority**  e 
Fishery Bureau  (Not reported as an involved actor in planning) 
Nature Conservation Associations***  a       a 
Hamburg Wasser (drinking water production 
& waste water treatment company) 
(Not reported as an involved actor in planning) 
Creek godparents f 
(3) Functionally interlinked centers****:  
Urban Planning (Not reported as an involved actor in planning) 
Monument Conservation Authority (Not reported as an involved actor in planning) 
Hamburg Port Authority        
 
Legend 
 Goal of this center 
 Matching of water management goals with those of the respective center 
 Neutral (irrelevant for center) 
 Unknown 
 Partially contradicting goals (context dependence) 
 Contradictions of water management goals with those of the respective center 
  Mixed: general tendency based on interviews and document analysis | range of possibilities based on special cases 
a certain species are preferred 
b protection of a certain status (e.g. a problem is cutting trees of a certain size for river restoration) 
c differing definition of invasive ‘alien’ species 
d priority of fast drainage and navigability for shipment 
e protection of water related systems in case of new ‘constructions’ and water usage allowance, but weighing up of all 
objectives of existing usages and new construction plans in plan-approval procedures 
f goals are varying from individual to individual and group to group 
* a variation of goals among different districts is very likely 
** same department as water management in districts: the head of department may decide in favor of the water 
management or the water maintenance or may find a compromise 
*** very active in the implementation process of the Water Framework Directive 
**** goals of these centers fit or do not fit to goals of the water management authority, but goals are never the same 
Tab. 3 Responsibilities and goals of decision-making centers in Hamburg: e.g. The protection of species is 
the goal of water management authorities. This goal is conflicting with goals of the Hamburg Port 
Authority which aims to ensure shipment with e.g. dredging out the fairway (destroys habitats). 
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System boundaries and level/ scale specificity 
System boundaries are rarely mentioned in existing definitions. As some of these refer to 
systems, it seems to be logical for system boundaries to be used as a reference point in 
operationalizing the existence of multiple centers. The system, as understood here, draws 
boundaries around centers which are functionally interlinked with each other in relation to 
some good or problem. This system does not need to perform in a certain way to be called a 
system10.  
The system boundaries should reflect the good/ problem in focus as well as the level/ scale of 
analysis. Both should be given by the research question. 
To illustrate this, the given good is now the possibility of shipping in a river. In this case, it 
seems to be useful to draw the analytical system boundaries along a sub-basin. There could be 
one water board counted as a decision-making center which is responsible for the 
maintenance (task) of the defined river. The system configuration for this specific good would 
be called monocentric. However, if the analyzed good is the possibility of shipping in a larger 
river network, it may be useful to draw the system boundaries along the basin or a nation 
state. Several water boards and other actors need to be considered. For this specific good 
multiple centers constitute the system. 
Slightly changing the focus, now to the fish habitat in the defined river (good water quality/ 
adequate hydromorphology), alters the picture. The sub-basin might serve as a system 
boundary. Though open mining at the edge of the sub-basin could influence the water quality. 
Processes and actors outside the sub-basin but within the influence area of the open mining 
might strongly influence the decisions made there. The analytical system boundaries should 
cover these causal chains so that actors within these boundaries are considered as centers.   
The system boundaries can be defined territorially, e.g. according to natural borders such as 
basins, artificial borders such as the area covered by infrastructure or administrative 
jurisdictions, or non-territorially according to possibilities of access or membership. 
 
The level/scale of analysis (e.g. local, regional, national, supra-national, global) alters the 
system boundaries as well. For the good ‘good status of waters’ different governance research 
questions are thinkable: 
- Local: How to restore a river stretch? 
- Regional: How to reduce diffusive nitrate pollution on agricultural sites? 
- National: How to find common standards on water quality and how to safeguard and 
monitor them? 
- Supra-national: How to effectively calibrate efforts among nations in favor of 
implementation control?   
The good stays the same, but the research question defines the level in focus, the scale and 
related to this the system boundaries as well. Significantly different types and numbers of 
decision-making centers need to be considered for the system: Whereas a water management 
authority is taken into account at the local level, at the national level these may be different 
public authorities and lobbying associations. A system could be characterized by a lower 
multiplicity of centers at one level compared to another level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
10 In some definitions the term system is only used if polycentric governance is performing in a certain way 
(well-performing or “in a coherent manner” (Ostrom et al., 1961)), but then it remains unclear within which 
boundaries centers need to be considered and their joint performance needs to be evaluated. 
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Berlin & Hamburg 
 
• What are the system boundaries? 
• At what levels are the considered decision-making centers located? 
 
System boundaries of analysis: two cities embedded in sub-basins 
The implementation of the EU WFD in Germany remained in federal state responsibility, 
although River Basin Communities (RBC) were established along the 10 major basins. No 
planning competency was transferred to RBCs.  
The good status of water bodies within the city is influenced by the activities within the 
basins - within and beyond city borders. Therefore, the analytical system boundaries are 
drawn along all sub-basins of rivers flowing at least partially through the city jurisdictions. 
It covers the cities and functionally interlinked areas of the surrounding federal states with 
all the different water usages and users and across different kinds of jurisdictional borders.  
 
Multiple levels of involved centers 
Berlin and Hamburg differ in the number of relevant levels (compare with Fig. 1 and Fig. 2) 
as well as in the location of key centers. Both cities share the RBC Elbe as a level on top of 
local implementation. Below, in Berlin two levels can be identified: the senate level and the 
level of citizens and nature conservation associations which are mainly active in 
participating in info-fora and workshops. In Hamburg up to four levels can be found, 
whereas a hierarchy in levels is difficult to define. Water management at senate and district 
level is supplemented by non-state-actors: the citizens as creek godparents, as participants 
in projects of the nature conservation associations or in district action days and in one of the 
few district experiments with public participation in planning. The nature conservation 
associations can be considered here as an extra level if scale is used to identify levels. It is, 
admittedly, interwoven with other levels through projects of differing scales and varying 
collaborations with authorities, citizens and very local member groups of the associations. 
 
Overlapping 
Actors need to form a common system to be considered decision-making centers. In some 
definitions ‘overlapping’ is a precondition for a system to be called polycentric (Skelcher, 
2005; McGinnis and Ostrom, 2011; McGinnis, 2011). Centers may overlap in space or 
individuals affected by their decisions and in the membership of individuals forming centers. 
Here it is assumed that functional overlapping between centers allows them to form a 
governance system (a network of interrelations) for a good or problem. 
This directs the focus to overlapping caused by decisions11, specifically spatial overlapping. 
Similar distinctions seem to be reasonable for groups of individuals affected by decisions. 
Two kinds of overlapping are conceivable. Functional overlapping occurs where centers 
overlap in their sphere of influence. Centers affect the sphere of overlapping through given 
functional interlinkages. Territorial overlapping refers to an overlapping of responsibility 
spheres (or target areas). For public authorities these are jurisdictions. In cases where the 
sphere of influence of a center is larger than the sphere of responsibility, functional 
overlapping corresponds with the concepts of externalities and spill-overs. If hydrological 
scales are not adopted in water governance systems, functional overlapping is presumably 
larger than territorial overlapping. For instance: two centers in flood protection with identical 
tasks form one analytical system. They do not overlap territorially as the jurisdictional borders 
                                                 
11 For information exchange/ learning processes overlaps in social relations might be important as well. 
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are clearly defined and not overlapping. Nevertheless, they overlap functionally as upstream 
and downstream decisions can influence each other.  
If centers are not functionally interlinked with each other (although they might overlap 
territorially - such as authorities for childcare and water management) they should not be 
considered as centers for identifying a single polycentric governance system, but rather 
separate systems. 
Furthermore, it can be differentiated between vertical overlapping and horizontal overlapping. 
Horizontally overlapping centers belong to the same level whereas vertically overlapping 
centers decide on different levels. The latter may contain hierarchical structures12 or overlaps 
without hierarchical relations among centers. In basically federal systems jurisdictions are 
vertically territorially neatly nested. Attention should be given to vertical and horizontal 
functional overlapping beyond territorial overlapping.    
In complex systems it is very likely that centers overlap in several ways, both territorially and 
functionally at the same time. Considering task specificity and overlapping, redundancy 
among centers is not automatically given in polycentric governance systems. Several 
conditions need to be fulfilled for centers to really take over tasks of other centers in case of 
failures (which should be the effect of redundancy).  
 
Berlin & Hamburg 
 
• What is the scale of decision-making centers and how do they overlap? 
 
Scale and overlapping may be analyzed at different levels of detail depending on the 
research question. Here only roughly outlined: Both cities overlap functionally with the 
surrounding federal states in sharing basins (Berlin: Brandenburg; Hamburg: Schleswig-
Holstein/ Lower Saxony). They need to solve similar issues with their surrounding 
counterparts (which may be at same or different levels resulting in horizontal or vertical 
overlapping) such as water quality and quantity and river connectivity. Issues of river 
restoration (beside influences on flood protection) create small-scale functional overlaps, 
but are expected to be managed more effectively and/ or cost-efficiently if coordinated in 
basins across jurisdictional borders. Both states follow different implementation strategies. 
Hamburg’s authorities indicated that they just tolerate Lower-Saxony’s activities, because it 
affects only a very small area. It would be very difficult to agree on one implementation 
strategy with both surrounding states. Hamburg avoids two different strategies within its 
jurisdiction. 
Hamburg additionally features vertical territorial overlapping between the senate water 
management (designated responsibility of area coordinators) and the district level and 
horizontal functional overlapping among districts themselves. The various activities of 
nature conservation associations create another layer of functional and territorial 
overlapping specific to each project.  
Visualizing the overlapping with the numerous other centers within and around the city 
jurisdictions would result in a very complex picture. 
 
The role of interaction and social interrelations 
The second main part concerning definitions on polycentricity is on social interrelations - in-
/interdependencies - and interaction of centers: ‘take each other into account’, ‘competition’, 
                                                 
12 Nevertheless, independence of lower authorities may be given through discretion. 
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‘coordination’, ‘contractual and cooperative undertakings’ and ‘conflict solving mechanisms’. 
Depending on the chosen defining elements quite different operationalizations are possible 
and necessary. They have different implications on the functioning of a system, e.g. choosing 
merely competition might lead to market analogies. 
The functioning of a system affects its outcome(s) – the performance to govern the good or 
problem in focus, here the good ecological status of waters. In Berlin (by 2014: (Schröder, 
2014)) only a few river restoration measures are constructed (e.g. in pilot projects), mainly 
because the first elaborated integrated concept (finished in 2009) remains stuck in a plan-
approval procedure13. Concepts for further river sub-basins were already developed but did 
neither enter plan-approval procedures by 2014 nor be constructed. The water maintenance 
authority was persuaded to conduct a few experiments on changing maintenance practices in 
favor of the WFD. Convincing them further could have accelerated WFD implementation in 
Berlin. 
Hamburg achieved a higher share of constructed measures. WFD planners started with easily 
identifiable tasks (e.g. connectivity measures) instead of large integrated concepts14 (on e.g. 
river restoration) and they framed measures as water maintenance to avoid time consuming 
approval procedures. However, the ecological outcomes (and cost-efficiency) in both cities - 
once Berlin has constructed the planned measures - remain uncertain.  
How can those differences in the functioning be explained? The rule setting in Berlin and 
Hamburg is similar. The same holds for the presence of center-types (compare columns 1 of 
Tab. 2 and Tab. 3). However, they are spread across different levels and vary on other 
multiplicity characteristics as laid out in the operationalization steps above. Does interaction, 
specifically coordination, among centers explain the different outcomes? Coordination 
(including public participation) is analyzed here because the WFD requires coordination 
across borders and sectors. 
For some authors coordination is a defining characteristic of polycentric governance systems. 
Pahl-Wostl et al. (2012) use high ‘effective coordination’ to distinguish polycentric 
governance regime types from fragmented ones. High coordination is operationalized as 
institutionalized coordination. However, rules-on-paper do not need to correspond with rules-
in-use. Galaz et al. (2012) use communication patterns, ranging from information sharing to 
very permanent interactions, and the degree of their formalization to distinguish systems in 
their degree of polycentricity. Though assuming that a strong formalization of numerous 
coordination processes lowers the independence of centers by lowering their discretion, it 
seems unreasonable to say that such systems have a stronger polycentric order than systems 
with less formalized processes. 
I propose that coordination15 processes should be in-use rather than formally provided and 
need to fit the purposes (e.g. information sharing, conflict resolution, use of synergies) of a 
governance system for good performance. This means adequate quality, frequency and 
formalization between relevant actors, but certainly adequacy strongly differs among systems 
with differing multiplicity characteristics as refined above.  
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 give an overview on WFD related coordination processes in Berlin and 
Hamburg. They illustrate the complexity in comparing processes. Berlin shapes the planning 
processes systematically. The water management authority attempts to gather all relevant 
actors within each sub-basin (across jurisdictional borders according to WFD requirements) at 
an early planning stage (before plan-approval procedures) for an integrated concept: steering 
                                                 
13 No progress was reported on Berlin’s websites by March 01st 2017. 
http://www.stadtentwicklung.berlin.de/umwelt/wasser/eg-wrrl/de/inberlin/panke2015.shtml  
14Districts get finances only for planning within their own jurisdictions. Joint and integrated plans would cause 
high decision costs. 
15 Here: loose contacts, information exchanges, consultations, joint projects, joint decision-making, singular and 
repeated processes, voluntary and forced processes etc. 
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meetings for authorities and experts and Info-Fora/ Workshops for the public. In contrast, 
coordination processes initiated by Hamburg’s water management are predominantly 
bilateral, irregular, unpredictable and often restricted to information exchange. Authorities do 
not try to gather all actors for planning, except in the Working Groups North, South and 
Tideelbe on how to classify transboundary water bodies (natural, heavily modified or 
artificial), which influences the ecological goal-setting. District authorities come together in 
the budget talks (once a year), in the AK WRRL for information exchange on general WFD 
topics and in the Water Round for sporadic exchange on WFD issues (predominantly on other 
water governance topics) excluding the senate. None of the processes facilitates integrated 
planning across jurisdictions. Only the local nature conservation associations established a 
participatory pilot project for the river Alster to show the state authorities how it works. They 
‘copied’ the public part of Berlin’s approach. One district tried to follow the example in a 
pilot project for 100 m of a river. Generally district water managers try to avoid formal 
procedures by cooperating with the water maintenance. Reported conflicts during the 
construction phase due to a lack of public participation and coordination with other authorities 
indicate an inadequate treatment of conflicts in Hamburg.  
 
 
Fig. 3 WFD Coordination processes in Berlin: e.g. Coordination between water management and nature 
conservation associations is given through conventional lobbying activities. 
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Fig. 4 WFD Coordination processes in Hamburg: e.g. The water authority has to (no exit) weigh up the 
interests of different agencies, such as the nature conservation authority, in a WFD plan (‘participation of public 
agencies’). Nevertheless, the water management tries to avoid such formal procedures (bubble without ingoing 
arrows) by defining measures as small as possible such as maintenance measures.  
 
Coordination processes explain why Hamburg shows more progress in constructing measures 
compared to Berlin – basically by closely cooperating with water maintenance authorities and 
by avoiding retarding procedures. However, this analysis does not explain why e.g. this 
cooperation functions. Berlin tries to establish this kind of cooperation with little success. 
Social interrelations among centers may provide the reasoning.  
The focus on those interrelations is covered by polycentricity definitions (compare with Tab. 
1; different terms are used) including:  
• ‘institutional setting’: Which decision-making center has to interact with whom and how? 
and Who has the freedom to interact with others (discretion)?  
• ‘independence’: Who has the incentive to interact with whom and, if applicable, how?  
This indicates what might happen between centers. Other factors and spontaneity influences 
how they really interact within their creative leeway16.  
The veto-player theory (Benz, 2009 referring to Tsebelis 1995, 2002) turned out to be a useful 
tool to analyze in-/interdependencies and answers those questions. It says that the chances for 
policy changes are reducing  
• with an increasing number of veto-players17 in a system,  
• with increasing ideological distance among those, and  
• with an increasing homogeneity18 of collective actors with veto-power.  
Considering the various possible interrelations among centers, the theory gives a hint on the 
center’s (un)willingness to interact. A reduced ability of some centers to reach their goals 
unilaterally may increase the willingness to coordinate. Unilateral goal achievement, in 
contrast, may decrease the willingness to coordinate (goal achievement aspects are included in 
Fig. 3 and Fig. 4).  
                                                 
16 The existence of discretion does not automatically lead to its use. 
17 Veto-players are actors whose agreement for a decision is necessary or whose non-agreement hampers change 
(Benz, 2009: 53) 
18 Greater homogeneity means fewer internal conflicts. 
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Social interrelations among centers in Berlin and Hamburg differ significantly. Different 
types of veto-players from WFD planning to construction are illustrated in Fig. 5 and Fig. 6. 
Key centers in both cities face similar institutional restrictions (e.g. plan-approval procedures 
conducted by the local water authority)19. Both are relatively free in choosing strategies for 
public participation and for collaboration with other authorities. Their discretion is restricted 
by differing availabilities of resources of finance and personnel. However, the different 
organizational settings of similar center-types result in varying in- and interdependencies with 
veto-points leading to different incentives for interactions which basically correspond with the 
findings on coordination processes. 
Berlin’s planners face several centers with veto-power since plans need detailing by the water 
maintenance or the construction planning authority and revision in plan-approval procedures. 
Hamburg has a strikingly low number of veto-players. District water management and 
maintenance belong to the same department. WFD planners use this structural vicinity and 
their discretion to frame plenty of their measures as maintenance measures20 to avoid formally 
provided processes especially long-lasting plan-approval procedures. The organizational 
separation from the maintenance authority prevents this in Berlin.  
To conclude these insights, it seems questionable that governance systems with multiple 
centers but different interrelation and coordination characteristics are equally polycentric and 
perform in the same way. Centers have different interaction incentives, may use their 
discretion differently and may self-organize through voluntary interactions with differing 
priorities and degrees of success. Therefore, there might be different sub-categories of 
polycentric governance systems or some of them should not be called polycentric. Requiring 
only ‘mutual adjustment’ or ‘take each other into account’ seems to reduce possibilities for 
meaningful propositions on system performance. Centers may adjust etc. in a non-
constructive way or even in contradicting good performance due to different interests and 
options for action. 
                                                 
19 All objections of other actors in a plan containing construction works are weighed up. 
20 Traditional maintenance practices cause various ecological problems. Changing them offers a faster and less 
expensive strategy for habitat improvement compared to large-scale river restoration projects. 
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Fig. 5 Veto-player constellations for WFD planners, Berlin: Plans of the senate water management need to be 
processed to a planning per meter by the construction planning/ water maintenance authority (strong veto-
players: able to change the plans in unintended ways). Most WFD measures go into plan-approval procedures 
conducted by the water authority which therefore becomes a direct veto-player (albeit in favor of the WFD). 
Actors participating in plan-approval procedures become indirect veto-players (not deciding on approval). 
Additionally, two minor veto-players are the financial administration (competition for financial resources with 
other projects) and district authorities (e.g. for the approval of jetties). 
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Fig. 6 Veto-player constellations for WFD planners, Hamburg: WFD plans are elaborated by the 7 district 
water management authorities (close to detailed construction planning). They are partially competing for money 
distributed by the senate water management. In case of non-agreement between water management and 
maintenance their department head is finally deciding. This department constitutes simultaneously the water 
authority approving their own plans. Districts can hamper (veto) the senate enforcing measures. 
 
How do multiplicity characteristics influence the functioning? 
Based on the described conceptual refinements propositions on the functioning of a system 
can be made. Some propositions are withdrawn from existing theories and others from 
empirical observations. Some have opposing tendencies in terms of the overall functioning of 
systems. In terms of a research agenda to theorize the functioning of polycentric governance 
systems, they need further empirical testing. An interesting question is whether some 
elements might be influenced in favor of performance without rearranging responsibilities, 
because of the trade-offs when the overall governance of multiple goods shall be optimized. 
 
Task specificity and level/ scale specificity 
Spreading responsibilities and tasks horizontally and vertically is likely to influence goal 
conflicts as well as ideological distances and increases costs for coordination and conflict 
resolution (Benz, 2009). Hamburg’s district water management, for example, indicated 
problems accessing monitoring data collected by the senate. This caused unexpected conflicts 
and deepened uncertainties in planning. 
The relation of good specificity and level/ scale specificity to the functioning of a system 
might be theorized by decision cost theory (Benz, 2009 citing Buchanan/ Tullock 1962) e.g. 
an increasing number of centers and levels raises decision-making costs and therefore reduces 
center’s interaction efforts. Differentiating the center configurations of systems by task 
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specificity refines the picture additionally. Presumably, in systems with a low number of key 
centers in contrast to a high number of non-key centers, key centers may feel more 
responsible for taking the initiative for coordination (like Berlin’s water management). 
However, Berlin and Hamburg also show that a differing organizational structure of possible 
coordination partners (location at different levels or different responsibility scales), may 
hamper interaction because of difficulties in identifying relevant centers and complying with 
hierarchies.  
 
Overlapping 
Overlapping may influence the functioning through influencing decision costs, externalities/ 
spill-overs and redundancy. Every overlapping may cause functional conflicts as well as 
synergies with additional variations through the task specificity configuration, as illustrated in 
Tab. 2 and Tab. 3. Derived from this, systems with more overall overlapping would face 
higher potentials for both of them. Presumably, decision costs will increase with the 
multiplicity of different kinds of overlapping as more interests need to be integrated. They 
might diminish the occurrence of (voluntary) coordination. However, the kind of potential 
conflicts and synergies themselves provides reasoning to interact in specific ways, to avoid or 
solve conflicts or to find and use synergies. Additionally, incentives for affected centers are 
given by the occurrence of externalities/ spill-overs. Those may outweigh their decision costs.  
Overlapping also affects the degree of potential redundancy. Tab. 4 provides different 
scenarios, e.g. territorially overlapping centers with the same task may develop a stronger 
redundancy than centers with the same goal. The occurrence of effective redundancy depends 
on further variables (see below). 
 
Two centers with … territorial overlapping only functional overlapping 
the same task strong  weak  
same goal weak  very weak  
functional interlinkages no  no  
Tab. 4 Degree of redundancy based on task specificity and overlapping: potential ability to take over tasks 
from other centers of the same system 
 
Independence 
The independence of centers is characterized by their possibilities of unilateral goal 
achievement, and therefore their incentives for interaction, and their discretion. The latter 
affects redundancy.  
Hamburg shows a higher potential for redundancy through overlapping than Berlin does. 
Hamburg’s nature conservation associations started to work - voluntarily - on state-
responsibilities - developing redundancy. Besides the necessity for discretion to become 
active in fulfilling tasks of other centers, it seems that this was a spontaneous development in 
combination with a longer tradition of creek godparenthoods (since 1986). Berlin’s 
maintenance authority hampers (veto) citizen activities comparable to Hamburg, although 
Berlin’s water management shows the willingness to support those. 
Hamburg’s senate (steering function with some attempts to plan measures) and district water 
management (measure planning), cannot sufficiently take over each other’s tasks. Therefore, 
redundancy among them is not effective. This raises the question of how strong redundancy of 
tasks (or the discretion) among centers needs to be to positively influence system performance 
in case of center’s failures. 
 
Interdependence   
The veto-player theory points on the number of veto-players and the ideological distance 
between centers. Whereas the center’s configuration on task specificity gives a hint on the 
overall decision-making costs, the veto-player configuration may indicate interdependencies 
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with especially high conflict potential which may be explanatory for the overall (non-)change 
in systems.  
The ideological distance, given by institutionalized and individual goals, between water 
management and maintenance was comparable within Hamburg’s district and Berlin’s senate 
level. In contrast to Berlin, Hamburg’s centers indicated that their physical and departmental 
vicinity (see above) led to better cooperation. This raises the question whether physical or 
organizational vicinity helps overcoming ideological distance and whether it induces 
interaction as a phenomenon of spontaneity which would occur with lower probability among 
distant centers.  
Conclusions 
Establishing a clear definition and operationalization of polycentric governance would help 
treading the path of theory building. Given the existing plurality, ‘You know it when you see 
it’ does not imply that we all identify the same as polycentric. Assuming that not everything 
should be called polycentric, this paper shows that there are at least five determinants for 
identifying a multiplicity of decision-making centers, ignoring other elements of the 
definition: (1) good or problem specificity, (2) the aggregation to units, (3) independence as a 
criterion to consider actors as centers, (4) analytical system boundaries and (5) functional 
overlapping of centers.  
Four steps are proposed to reduce fuzziness in operationalizing polycentricity for comparative 
governance analysis. These steps illuminate characteristics of governance systems regardless 
whether those systems are called polycentric in the end. The analysis of the multiplicity of 
centers according to their (a) good and (b) task specificity (key centers, centers with similar 
goals, functionally interlinked centers) shows who is influencing the outcome, although some 
centers might not be included in coordination processes. Their tasks and goals may cause 
conflicts and synergies in different combinations. (c) The overlaps map where conflicts, 
synergies as well as redundancy might appear. (d) System boundaries are set analytically but 
need to be adjusted to the functional interlinkages as well. They determine the comparability 
of systems regarding the multiplicity of centers. 
Using the polycentricity lens illuminates here the relation between multiplicity characteristics 
and the functioning of systems. The cases of the EU Water Framework Directive 
implementation in Berlin and Hamburg show that, overall, both are characterized by a 
multiplicity of centers. However, they differ in how responsibilities, functions, power and 
resources are distributed horizontally and vertically as well as in who is involved in 
interactions and in social interrelations.  
Overall, both might be called polycentric according to the minimum requirement of a 
multiplicity of centers, but in terms of key centers directly responsible for WFD 
implementation, Berlin appears significantly more centralized. While Hamburg shows a faster 
but less integrative implementation, how the ecological outcomes unfold stays uncertain. 
Interaction patterns in both cases explained the outcomes, but seem, besides the reasoning 
through conflicts and synergies, merely spontaneous at the first glance. The analysis of social 
interrelations (merely discretion and veto-player characteristics), however, proofed to be 
useful to find explanations for the functioning of those systems. 
In favor of theory building on performance in polycentric governance systems social 
interrelations and interactions need a closer look. Propositions on the system’s functioning 
based on the described conceptual refinements are set out in terms of a research agenda.    
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